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1967/10/04

THE WHITE H[illegible]
WASHINGTON

18

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 4, 1967

Mr. President:

Here is the latest from Paris.

For the first time -- literally -- they seem more anxious than we; although the substance is obscure and thin.

I am sure you will wish to meet on it tomorrow.

Walt. Rostow

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E.O. [illegible] Sec. 3.5
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By SDW/sc NARA, Date 7/17/00

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9HR

Read/Kissinger Telecons, 8:00 p.m., October 4
8:30 p.m., October 4

M visited Bo and spent an hour and a half with him at approximately 2230-2400 Paris time. M told Bo of K's views of the serious reactions in Washington to the change of the text which K had received this morning, and he asked Bo to review that text again with him. Again Bo confirmed the accuracy of the opening paragraph of the earlier text and the accuracy of the statement of the first eventuality ("A public declaration by the Government of the United States about the cessation. This declaration could take place either before or after the cessation.") Bo said since he had not heard from Hanoi about the M and A conversation there in July, he could not comment on the other two eventualities which were mentioned in the message K received this morning. Bo would not discuss further his renegging on the words "solemn engagement" or the paragraph in which those words appear.

Bo then said that he wanted M to send a message to K which would come as close as possible to eventuality (b) in the communication K received in the mail. M wrote out the text in French and read it through with Bo three times to assure its accuracy. M also did an English translation for Bo.

Message from M to K:

"After having discussed with Bo and after having obtained confirmation of his country's position regarding the eventuality of talks you should know that if the US really wants to talk it is necessary first to stop without conditions the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV. I have come to the conclusion, recalling also a previous conversation in the presence of A, that the scenario could be the following: The Government of the United States would send a first message through our channel (K/M-A) announcing unequivocally the unconditional cessation of bombing. Once this has been effectively realized, a second message still through our channel might suggest the opening of the dialogue at a date and site proposed by you. If you and your friends agree on such a scenario, let Bo know this agreement through a written

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message which I will then transmit to Bo. I do not know if what I say is appropriate; you know this better than I."

M said the last sentence of the message was added when Bo told M to end with something "friendly and conciliatory". Bo told M he would stand by to get K's reaction.

At 8:30 pm. EDT K called M to say that he should stand down for the night; that K's Washington friends would study developments carefully; and as K has predicted there was some concern in Washington about the virtual abandonment of the text sent K in the mail. M subsequently reported that he had conveyed this message to Bo, and Bo had indicated willingness to see M again even at 2:00 a.m. Paris time.

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